Abswct: This paper concentrates on proposing a framework to implement the PKI enables security in XML documents. by defining U common framework and processing rules that can be s h r e d across applications using common tools. avoiding the need for extensive rusromiration of applications to add Security. The Framework reuses the concepts. algorithms and core rechnologies of legacy security systems while introducing chnnges necessary ro support extensible inregration with XML. This nllows interopernbiliry with a wide range of existing infrnstrucrures and across deployments. Currently no strict security models and mechanisms ore available rhat con provide specification and enforcement of securiry policies for XML documents. Such models are crucial in order to facilitate n secure dissemination of XML documents. containing information of different sensitivity levels. among (possibly large) user communities.
INTRODUCTION
Recent advancement in XML and increasing use of World Wide Web allow users to use internet as a document sharing and hosting system. with certain security features. XML is becoming most prevalent means through which documents and data are encoded for distribution among users on the web. At the network and document security front, older security models, such as publiclprivate key encryption model. do provide a set of core security algorithms and technologies that can be used as a wrapper over XML document. but don't allow working within the document itself and managing the contenu. Along with. these standards were not designed to support common XML technical approaches for managing content, such as specifying content with uniform resource identifier strings or using other XML standard definitions for providing hyperlink services within XML content (11.
The best-known simplicity of XML is to provide portability of data between disparate business systems contrasts with the complexity of traditional and very structured Public-Key lnfrasvucture (PKI). A key architectural goal in the XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) is to shield XML application developers from the complexity of PIU implementation. It enables XML-based systems to rely on complex trust relationships without the need for specialized end-entity PKI application logic on the client platforms where XML processing is taking place, thus reducing overheads.
To be able to understand the technology behind XML security there is a necessity of explaining some fundamental. definitions. The second section of this paper defines some explanations of security and then the rest of the sections define the proposed framework to implement security in XML documents.
TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES USED FOR

SECURITY OF XML
There are various techniques that are being used to secure applications that are using XML as storage or communication medium. All these techniques are wrapped over a XML document to provide security features and none of them can be embedded within the document.
Securing a XML document with SSLnPsec is the common way to provide security 121. SSL uses handshake to authenticate a requester and responder with help of certificates. It also encrypts the exchanged data. SSL can only authenticate and encrypt a communication between two points. Requesting and responding to a XML based web service often takes more routes than just one, providing an adequate solution if the route of the message is known in advance, but this is often not the case. Additionally, SSL only protects the communicated data during its transmission. Once the data arrives to the end point. the end host has to use other techniques to maintain the security.
For example if to points (A and D) with two intermediate points (6 and C) want to communicate with each other, A has to go throw 6 and C in order to get to D. In this case it cannot use SSL to authenticate itself and D. since SSL can only authenticate between two points. It could use encryption. but this requires intermediates 6 and C to be able to encrypt and decrypt the messages in order to he able to process them. Another problem with the SSL techniques for XML Web services is that SSL authentication and encryption consume a large amount of CPU time and consequently the transaction process is slowed down. Imagine how slow and laborious it would he for a server, to process several requests at the same time. A consequence of the above mentioned security lacks could is that exchanged messages get easier to copy.
IPsec is a secure format of IP. It consists of two pans. AH (Authentication header) for authentication and ESP (Encapsulating security payload) for encryption. IPsec is intended to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality. This technique provides message integrity, signature and encryption of exchanged data, hut lacks videlicet point to point authentication and the possibility to crypt and sign selective pans I2.31.
H'ITPR is a protocol for the reliable transport of messages from one application program to another over the Internet. even in the presence of failures either df the network or the agents on either end. Traditional HTTP is a very insecure protocol. for instance it never insures the exchanged data to reach its destination. In order IO 
XML Encryption
XML encryption ensures that data cannot be read by Unauthorized users. Unlike SSL. this technique enables the data to be protected both in transport and on the user's computers. This specification gives guidelines about algorithms, key information etc. XML encryption can use both symmetric and asymmetric keys, but more widely symmetric since these techniques are less CPU intensive and are therefore more suitable for larger data exchange.
XML Key Management Specification
To be able to use FKI. a system that can handle certificates and keys must exist. In order to achieve high security these standards need to be used in conjunction. An XML encryption must be able to use signatures or else the sender cannot be trusted and the XML signature has to use XKMS to handle keys that are exchanged. An important issue to be considered concerning XML encryption and signatures is that, these techniques are new and there is not an implemented prototype using these techniques. 
SAML and XACML
DESIGN OF A FRAMEWORK TO SECURE XML APPLICATIONS
An essential requirement of new security framework is that it should work naturally with content created using XML. The overall objective of designing a XML Security Framework is to guarantee the aspects of integrjty. confidentiality. authentication and accountability (key management). These aspects shall be taken as high level requirements to the design of framework and should be further elaborated to arrive at more tangible requirements.
The XML Security Framework is designed with a goal to fit together the ideas of the XML Encryption and XML Digital Signature in the light on the specifications as provided by W3C into one high performance implementation. There are many technical reasons why various available XML based security providing standards could not be used together separately. All of the guidelines available on the web
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? related to applying security in XML Documents are relatively new and are made specifically to focus on some specific aspect. Not a lot of work is being done on the integration of such aspects and developers find it difficult to incorporate security inside their XML based setups despite of having very robust set of traditional available secunty tools. The major god of the XML Security Framework is to provide an easy way implement security in any XML based application in integration with traditional cryptographic techniques. XML Security Framework is intended to introduce security in XML applications or web services. The framework make use of available native XML technologies as discussed earlier but gives a consistent singular APIlDesign to developers to introduce security into their applications.
Components of Framework
The Framework defines the security system in forms of components, These components will be independent and will be providing atomic operations that are needed while implementing a secure XML based application. The components should be designed with respect to the level they are categorized into, such as level 1 and level 2 components. A1 the firs1 layer are "level I " components, consisting of all the basic level functionality that is required by any security systems. The level I components will give an interface to the next level components to use the traditionally available methods for security and also provide XML parsing capabilities to the higher level components, such as parsers. request I response management components and inter-communication components.
The "level 2" components are XML transformations components. key management components. encryption I decryption components, signature I validation components and access control components. forming the core of the framework. These components will be providing the methods and their implementations that are defined or outlined in the various XML security related specifications provided by the W3C. There is one very important consideration of these components that is they will be talking XML as input and after successful operation the output will also be an XML document. Thus a true XML developer will be enjoying the fun of using XML and also making the framework conforming to one of property of XML. There will be a two way flow of XML data inside the framework. One way the XML data will move to get secure and as it moves towards the end the relevant security assertions are inserted over it and when it gets out, the resultant XML will be a perfect secure XML following all the standard XML security standards. The other way in, will be the secure XML document and its output will be the XML that would be extracted as the result of applying the vanom XML security assertions or access control policies. A simple flow diagram is shown in figure 1.
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XML Encryption and Signing Component
In the Encryption and Signing process, there can be a possible need of counter signature. or partial encryption, the framework proposes that it is better to performs signature or encryption by processing input XML along with a stencilltemplate that specifies a signature or encryption skeleton, the way to use transformation component, the usage methods for traditional cryptographiclalgorithms components, and the way to interface with XML key management component for key selection process. This stencil document will be an XML document itself with same in structure as the desired result but some of the nodes will be left empty and will be filled by the XML encryptiodsignature components after performing relevant computations. Signature or encryption component controls the whole process and stores the required temporary data. Since the Stencil information is also a XML file, it might be created in advance and saved in a file and can be given to the application as an input otherwise the security framework API will have ta generate a stencil by itself gathering information by itself. This logic allows application to create stencils without using XML Security Framework functions. Also in some cases stencil should be inserted in the signed or encrypted data (for example, if you want to create an enveloped or enveloping signature). Signature verification and data decryption do not require template because all the necessary information is provided in the signed or encrypted document ( fig  3) [71. reading data from an URI, XML parsing, XML transformation, calculation ' digest. encrypting or decrypting. Each transform provides at least one of the following callbacks: "push binary", "push X M L , "pop binary" or "pop X M L .
XML
In order to simplify transforms development. additional "execute" callback is added. This callback updates internal transform buffers and is used by the "default" XMWbinary push and pop callbacks. as shown in figure 3 . Far example. most of the crypto transforms could be implemented by just implementing one "execute" callback. However, in some cases using pusMpop callbacks is more efficient. When necessary. XML Security Framework constructs a transforms chain as specified in the template or document and processes data by "pushing" or "popping" through the chain. For example, then binary data chunk is pushed through a binary-to-binary transform, it processes this chunk and pushes the iesult to the next transform in the chain. The following transforms chain might be constructed during digest calculation. 
Key Management Component
A key in XML Secunty Framework is a representation of the <dsig: Keylnfa/> element and consist of several key data objects. The "value" key data usually contains raw key material (or handlers to key material) required to execute particular crypto transform. Other key data objects may contain any additional information about the key. All the key data objects in the key are associated with the same key material. For example, if a DSA key material has both an X509 certificate and a PGP data associated with it then such a key can have a DSA key "value" and two key data objects for X509 cedficate and PGP key data, shown in figure 5. XML Security Framework has several "invisible" key data classes. These classes never show up in the keys data list of a key but are used for <dsig:KeyInfo/> children processing (<dsig:KeyName/>, <dsig:EncryptedKey/>. ... ). As with transforms. application might add any new key data objects or replace the default ones.
Key Managers
Processing some of the key data objects require additional information which is global across the application (or in the particular area of the application). For example, X509 certificates processing require a common list of crusted certificates to be available. XML Security Framework keeps all the common information for key data processing in a collection of key data stores called "keys manager", Framework which is supposed to b e shared by many different components. Usually keys manager is initialized once at the application startup and later is used by XML Security Framework routines in "readonly" mode. If application or crypto functions need to modify any of the key data stores inside keys manager then proper synchronization must be implemented. In the same time, application can create a new keys manager each time it needs to perform XML signature, verification, encryption or decryption.
Inter-Process Communication Components
Application may control XML Security Framework engines behavior using several context objects. New context objects are created for each operation and could not be reused. XML Security Framework also uses context objects to store temporary data and return additional information to the application.
SUMMARY
This concluded the higumiddie level design of the framework, there are a lot of issues will come during the exact implantation of the framework. A portion of the framework is currently being implemented. There is still a lot that can be done on this framework. The features of the framework that are lacking to be discussed in this paper are access control component and digital rights protection component.
The XML Security framework is not the exact solution to the problems of XML based security. but it is basically to show the way of how all the various available methods of implementing security can fit together to provide what is actually needed. In Future this framework will improve as implementation will be done completely and as maturity level increase it may one day can act as the exact solution.
The planned future work for this paper is to implement the framework up to its current status and then apply various software testing schemes to make the implementation mature, efficient and reliable. Other research oriented areas in relation to this paper can be the up gradation of the framework to satisfy the upcoming security needs like Access Control and Rights Management and also improving the already implemented models.
